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Abstract. Since independence, Ghana has implemented many development paradigms, 
from big-push state-led industrialization to neoliberal market-oriented policies. However, 
the goal of industrialization has eluded the country. In recent years, new home-grown 
policy initiatives are beginning to replace neoliberal prescribed policies of Western donors 
and financial institutions. This study explores these new innovations focusing on the One 
District One Factory initiative. We make the case that the policy is an innovative thinking on 
industrialisation and may reflect a realignment of Ghana’s development paradigm with the 
Beijing Consensus after many years of being taunted as a success story of IMF-World Bank 
neoliberal reform programmes.  
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1. Introduction  
ne of the few noticeable developments in the international system 
over the past few decades is the impressive growth of China. The 
growth of China has rekindled the debate as to what the 
appropriate path to promote growth and development in the world’s 
poorest nations or to use Paul Coullier’s term the ‚Bottom Billion‛ is 
(Coullier, 2007).  
Since the mid-1980s, the Bretton Woods Institutions and Western donors 
have pushed the agenda of neoliberal economic reforms and democratic 
governance (Washington Consensus or Market Fundamentalism) as the 
pathway to economic growth and developmentin developing nations. The 
assumption is that developing countries are unable to develop because of 
price distortion resulting from unnecessary state intervention in the 
market. These nations are subsequently counselled to adopt neoliberal 
policies and cut back the role of the state in the market place. This was 
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envisaged tocorrect price distortions and attract investment, which will 
propel development.  
After many years of adopting neoliberal market policies, the envisaged 
growth and development has eluded many third world economies. On the 
contrary, third world citizens and governments have become disillusioned 
about the outcome of the neoliberal policies as many of these countries 
remain confined to the periphery of the world production chain, largely as 
suppliers of raw materials with associated unstable and low prices. The 
disillusion about the so-called Washington Consensus has become more 
pronounced since the 2008 financial crises. The former Deputy Treasury 
Secretary of the United States, Roger Altman rightly noted that the 2008 
financial crises has brought the ‚American Model ...under cloud‛ (Altman 
as quoted by Kualantzick, 2013). The crisis has allowed long held and deep-
seated resentments about the neoliberal agenda to be openly expressed, 
particularly in emerging economies.      
Whereas the Washington consensus was is in disarray, the fascination 
and the appeal of the Chinese growth model have witnessed significant 
swell.  China’s global rise anchored on its monumental growth over the 
decades (Beijing Consensus) is clearly seen by most in the developing 
world as a clear alternative to the Washington Consensus that has 
dominated development thinking and policy over the past three to four 
decades (Turin, 2010). 
China’s growth, contrary to the prescriptions of the Washington 
Consensus is underpinned by an active state involvement in the 
development process. It involves prioritizing areas that should receive 
needed funding and support from the state and state regulation of key 
sectors to promote overall growth. It recognises that the development 
process needs to take care of local circumstances. Self-determination in 
deciding without external influence what is appropriate for a nation is the 
unique attribute of what is now the Beijing Consensus. Unlike the 
Washington consensus, which consists of elaborate principle and policies, 
the Beijing Consensus allows each state the luxury to determine its best 
path to growth, highlighting local conditions and circumstances.  
As pointed out by Ubi (2014) African countries have to learn from the 
Chinese growth and development experiences. However, it is unclear the 
extent to which these countries are being influenced by the Chinese 
experience and are pursuing policies to that effect. This paper explores the 
situation in Ghana in the light of what appears to be indicators of change in 
development thinking and practises.  
In recent years, the Ghanaian state seems to be an active player in 
economic and development policy. Instead of cutting back, the state is 
taking the lead in providing incentives to businesses to invest in areas 
considered important for economic growth and development. Given the 
fact that Ghana has for long been taunted as a success of the neoliberal 
agenda in Africa, this new development is significant. In other words, to 
what extent can the claim be made that the new industrialisation policy of 
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One District One Factory is inspired or aligned to what is now known as 
the Beijing Consensus? 
This paper will address two major issues. Firstly, it will attempt to 
ascertain the main features of the Beijing Consensus. Secondly, it will 
examine how the policy of One District One Factory is in line with the 
Beijing Consensus. To address these issues, the paper adopts the historical 
analysis approach with qualitative research design. This approach allows 
us to analyse the history of development and industrialisation in Ghana 
and how successive models of development approaches failed to address 
Ghana’s industrial development leading to the shift in development 
thinking in recent years.  
The study relies extensively on secondary data. The rest of the paper 
will be elaborated in four sections. The next section will address the issue of 
the existence or otherwise of a Beijing consensus. The second part will be a 
historical analysis of Ghana’s development policies since independence.  
This will be followed by an assessment of the innovations in development 
thinking in Ghana with emphasis on the One district One factory Initiative. 
And the final part will draw conclusion.  
 
2. Is there a Chinese model or a Beijing Consensus? 
China’s economic growth and its impact on existing world order 
continue to be debated among scholars of various academic backgrounds. 
In the world of political economy, the debate is even more intense. Whereas 
some scholars have proclaimed the birth and dominance of a new economic 
model, others have played down such assertion and even denied the 
existence of a Chinese model of development.   
The existence of a unique Chinese development model has been put 
forth forcefully in 2004 by Joshua Cooper Ramón. Ramón coined the term 
‘The Beijing Consensus’ to describe what he perceives as a unique Chinese 
development model (Ramón, 2004, p.4). To him, ‘the Beijing Consensus’ 
has overtaken the Washington Consensus as the dominant development 
paradigm. In his words, the Beijing Consensus ‚replaces the widely-
discredited Washington Consensus, an economic theory made famous in 
the 1990s for its prescriptive, Washington-know-best-approach to telling 
other nations how to run themselves‛ (Ramón, 2004, p.4). The Washington 
Consensus according to Ramón (2004, p.4) is ‚a hall mark of end-of-history 
arrogance<‛  China’s development produce an alternative thinking that is 
more realistic for many developing nations. According to Ramón (2004, 
p.5), ‚...whether China’s reform succeeds or ends in a tragic failure, the 
Beijing Consensus is already drawing a wake of new ideas that are very 
different from those coming from Washington‛. 
Though Ramón admitted that the Beijing Consensus does not put 
forward strict policy prescription as the case of the Washington Consensus, 
he put forth three key tenets that distinguish the Beijing Consensus. First, is 
the claim that innovation is the only means to accelerate change in society. 
Second, is the assertion that development entails much more than GDP or 
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GDP per capita growth rate. The ultimate aim of development should be to 
improve the standard of living or the quality of life of people. Third, and 
perhaps, the most important feature of the Beijing consensus for purposes 
of its international appeal is the argument that development requires self-
determination, which is rooted in a classical or Hobbesian notion of 
sovereignty.  It requires all nations to make free choices about their path to 
development without imposition by any external actor. Thus, there is no 
universal political and economic principle or rules that are applicable to all 
societies. There should be pragmatism in policy choice. In the words of 
Ramón, ‚China’s path to development is, of course, unrepeatable by any 
other nation‛ (Ramón, 2004, p.5). In this way, other nations must adopt 
development policies that best suit their conditions. The Chinese model is 
dynamic, flexible and lacks a clear set of readily prescriptive policies, which 
are applicable to all human societies. It calls on nations to identify what 
will work within a given socio-economic and cultural milieu and 
leveraging on it to propel their development.  
The appeal of the Chinese model, particularly among developing 
countries cannot be ignored. According to Ramón ‚...what is more 
important is that China’s new ideas are having a gigantic effect outside 
China. China is making a path for other nations around the world who are 
trying to figure out not simply how to fit into the international order in a 
way that allows them to be truly independent, to protect their way of life 
and political choices in a world with a single massively powerful centre of 
gravity‛ (Ramón, 2004, p.3). He further noted that ‚China is writing its own 
book now. The book represents fusion of Chinese thinking with lessons 
learned from the failure of globalisation culture in other places. The rest of 
the world has begun to study this book‛ (Ramón, 2004, p.5). 
There is little doubt that the rest of the world, particularly the 
developing world has started reading the Chinese story. As noted by Abad 
(2010, p.48) ‚some developing states have been encouraged by those 
impressive growth rates experience by the People’s Republic of China and 
have tried to follow a similar pattern of development‛. According to Abad 
(2010, p.48), the Beijing Consensus represents ‚a clear departure from the 
classical mechanisms promoted by the global financial institutions<‛ In 
the view of Abad, although the Beijing consensus has not replaced the 
Washington Consensus, it ‚<could possibly replace the Washington 
Consensus (Abad, 2010, p.48). Two developments are likely to make this 
possible in his view. The first of these developments is the rising number of 
developing states, which are embarking on similar pattern of development. 
The second development is the growing number of states which are 
establishing trade and investment relations with China. Given the level of 
Chinese trade, investment and aid, particularly with developing nations, 
there is no doubt that China is having an influence within these nations 
(Abad, 2010, p.51). 
In coming to a similar conclusion like Abad, Dirlik (2006) questioned the 
appropriateness or the usefulness of the concept of Beijing consensus, 
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arguing that the concept lack precise and specific conceptual meaning. In 
his view, the Beijing Consensus is ‚a notion, rather than a concept or an 
idea, because it does not have the coherence that we associate with either of 
those terms‛ (Dirlik, 2006, p.1). However, he concedes that the 
development pattern of China or the Beijing Consensus, particularly the 
inherent notion of self-determination, provides an alternative to US 
unilateralism.  Dirlik concludes that the Beijing consensus is not a direct 
replicable model but a new paradigm or analytical lens to view the world.  
To a large extent, Dirlick contention that the Beijing consensus lacks 
precision as a concept points to an implicit attempt to discover a given 
pattern or set of policy prescriptions as is often associated with the 
Washington Consensus. Yet, the absence of such attributes is the unique 
attribute of the Beijing Consensus. It emphasizes the need for development 
policy to be localised and determine by local circumstances without co-
optation of the policy space by external actors. As noted by Turin, (2010, 
p.2), ‚The Beijing Consensus is not actually a consensus in the same way 
that Washington Consensus has come to be understood, as an ideal of 
development. Instead, it is a new way of thinking about the global order 
that is intended to be contrarian, and which realizes value-most basically-as 
an alternative to the currently dominant ideology‛. For Turin, it is because 
of the position of the Beijing Consensus ‚as an ‚alternative‛ to the 
Washington Consensus that it is naturally appealing to states that have not 
benefited from the existing international power structure‛ (Turin, 2010, 
p.2). Thus, the Beijing Consensus will ‚continue to play a growing and 
increasingly important role in shaping future development initiatives 
throughout the world‛ (Turin, 2010, p.2). 
Just as the Beijing Consensus has won many adherent and defenders, 
many have questioned its sustainability as a model for development. 
Suisheng (2010), for example, argued that although the Beijing Consensus 
is gaining popularity among developing countries, it may not endure long 
enough to displace the Washington models since the China model is 
peculiar to the Chinese historical experience. In his understanding, such 
conclusions that the Chinese model would replace the Western model are 
rather premature. He pointed out two conditions that could undermine the 
models ability to surpass the Washington Consensus. The first is that the 
model lacks moral appeal because it is guided entirely by pragmatism 
which by definition is behaviour disciplined by neither a set of values nor 
established principles. Also, he pointed out that the model has not been 
effective in dealing with many crucial aspects of human development both 
at home and abroad. Issues of environmental pollution, inequality and 
oppression are still largely unattended to by the model. While Suisheng 
(2010) may be right in suggesting that it is too early to assert that the Beijing 
consensus would replace the Washington Consensus, the two reasons he 
advanced as conditions that would undermine the model need to be 
interrogated. The first claim of the model lacking a value appeal is based 
more on misinterpretation of the model. The Beijing Consensus is not a 
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coherent water-tight set of policies or principles that countries are to follow 
in the manner like the Washington Consensus. It is distinguished by its 
flexibility and high degree freedom for each state to choose the best path to 
development. It does not seek to promote any particular value as a 
universal truth, which is applicable to all human societies. Secondly, issue 
of inequality and pollution are equally a greater challenge to developing 
countries that have experiment the Washington Consensus over the years. 
They are not unique to the Beijing consensus. 
A more opened attack on the Beijing Consensus came from Yang (2010) 
in his article ‚The End of the Beijing Consensus: Can China’s Model of 
Authoritarian Growth Survive?‛. For him the idea a Beijing Consensus is 
non-existing. According to him, ‚...over the last 30 years, the Chinese 
economy has moved unmistakably toward the market doctrines of  
neoclassical economics...purely redistributive programs have been kept to a 
minimum and central government transfer have been primarily limited to 
infrastructure spending‛ (Yang, 2010, p.1). He held the view that the 
Chinese political systems legitimacy is based on continues economic 
growth, however, growing inequality and internal and external imbalance 
have been created over the years. Unfortunately, ‚strong and privileged 
interest groups and commercialized local governments are blocking equal 
distribution of economic growth throughout society, thereby rendering 
futile the CCP’s strategy of trading economic growth for people’s consent 
to its absolute rule‛ (Yang, 2010, p.3). Yang (2010) concludes that popular 
discontent or resistant and economic imbalance are now driving China 
towards a crisis situation that would undermine the stability of the state 
and the CCP’s hold on political power. 
John Williamson (2012) also explored the appropriateness of the Chinese 
model for developing nations. He cautioned developing countries on the 
attempt to adopt the Chinese model. According to him, the notion of 
innovation can be very costly to both multinational companies and those 
who have to pay for reinvention of the wheel. He also noted that China’s 
call for gradualism is only partially useful and not appropriate at all times. 
Furthermore, China’s authoritarian political system is only appealing to 
third world leaders not its people (Williamson, 2012). Williamson’s 
criticisms show yet again that much of the criticisms of the Chinese model 
are underscore by misrepresentation or misinterpretation of the Chinese 
model. For instance, the Chinese model does not insist on authoritarianism 
as a precondition for development. It equally does not insist that all 
countries have to adopt the gradualist approach nor does it call for all 
countries to reinvent the wheels of development. 
There is little doubt that the Chinese experience offers a unique way of 
thinking about development in third world economies. Admittedly, 
Chinese experience may not repeatable in other economies but it offers new 
ideas on development. It is also having considerable influence on third 
world leaders. Ghana political leaders have not hidden their admiration for 
the economic achievement of the Chinese. Ex-president John Mahama, 
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expressed this by noting that ‚China's example of having been able to 
create the largest movement of people out of poverty is an example to us 
that we can also replicate it in our country.‛2 
This paper aims at assessing development policies in Ghana to establish 
how the Ghanaian leadership is pursuing policies that are oriented to local 
circumstance as advocated by the Chinese model. To this end, we are 
interested in assessing how the One District One Factory Initiative aligned 
with the Beijing consensus on the basis of being innovative and suitability 
to the Ghanaian situation.     
 
3. The history of development policy in Ghana: From 
independence to 2016 
 Since independence in 1957, Ghana has experimented with different 
development paradigms with the aim of finding lasting remedy to the twin 
ills of poverty and underdevelopment. The weaknesses of the colonial 
economy were significant in galvanizing popular support for the anti-
colonial movement in the Gold Coast (Ghana). Nkrumah mobilised the 
Ghanaian society with the promise that political independence would 
translate to economic growth and development. As Kwame Nkrumah aptly 
put it ‚seek ye first the political kingdom and all other things shall be 
added unto it‛ (Kwame Nkrumah as quoted by Addo, 1999, pp.82-83).  
After attaining political independence in 1957, the CPP and Nkrumah 
set out to achieve economic development through what Krassowki, (1974) 
referred to as ‚planned restructuring‛of the economy. Under the influence 
of what he termed ‚scientific socialism‛ or consciencism (Owusu, 2006, 
p.132; Nkrumah, 1970), Nkrumah hoped to transform Ghana’s agrarian and 
cash crop (cocoa) dependent economy to an industrial society. Though, the 
ultimate political goal was the establishment of a socialist state, it was 
believed that this goal can only be achieved through the establishment of 
an industrial foundation.  
Subsequently, development plans were developed and implemented as 
the blueprints to economic growth and development (Adom & Zogbator, 
2015; Fosu & Aryeetey, 2008). The objective of these plans was to achieve 
structural transformation of the agrarian Ghanaian economy to an 
industrial economy. The path to development of Nkrumah and the CPP 
entailed a considerable state involvement in the development process 
(Akornor, 2006, p.19). In this direction, there was emphasis on massive 
state-led import-substitution industrialization, with the goal of reducing 
the reliance on the export of primary products, particularly cocoa.  
Many state-owned industries were established between the mid-1950s 
and 1960s to produce goods with local raw materials for local consumption 
and export in order to reduce imports and what was seen as unfavourable 
terms of trade. The enterprises were established to produce items including 
chocolate, vegetable oil, textiles, tobacco, drinks, glass, cement and shoes, 
 
2 Xinhua (2014). [Retrieved from]. Accessed on 15th June 2015 
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amongst others. To guarantee regular raw material supply for the newly 
established industries, state-owned farms were established. The infant 
industries were also shielded from foreign competition through tax 
holidays and other protective measures (Adom & Zogbator, 2015). 
The state led import-substitution paradigm was informed by the 
dominant economic paradigm at the time. Viewing the world in a purely 
dependency terms, Nkrumah saw the ills of the Ghanaian economy in its 
confinement to the periphery of the world’s economy (Biney, 2011; 
Nkrumah, 1963). Thus, the basic goal was to break away from this structure 
through import substitution industrialisation. Nkrumah’s view of the 
development process entails some appreciation of what is contemporarily 
termed as the ‚Beijing Consensus‛. He perceived the process as dynamic 
and requiring of changes where appropriate. In his owned words, the 
‚uncharted path the country had embarked upon required proceeding 
from try and error. Changes, which are made today, may themselves call 
for further change tomorrow‛ (Nkrumah quoted by Biney, 2011, p.103). It is 
explicit in this assertion that Nkrumah understood the need to adopt 
policies based on circumstances and make necessary changes from time to 
time. While trying to achieve this, Nkrumah rightly understood the need 
for access to foreign capital. Consequently, he adopted a ‘strategy of 
competitive co-existence‛towards foreign industries operating in Ghana 
(Esseks, 1971, p.59). While welcoming foreign investment, the policy was to 
channel it to areas that the government perceived as engines of growth. 
Yet, the goal was to strengthen local enterprises and eventually 
decolonized the economy by taking it out of the control of both foreign 
capital and the colonial structures. 
By the time Nkrumah was overthrown in 1966, his policies had achieved 
mixed results. On the positive side, there had been significant Ghanaian 
ownership of the economy compared to the early independence years. As 
at 1965, about 35 percent of imports to Ghana were handled by state 
importing enterprises while 50 percent of all insurance businesses were 
being transacted by the state insurance corporation. In addition, 27 percent 
of total output in the manufacturing sector was being produced by state 
owned enterprises or private enterprises with government interest (Esseks, 
1971, p.59). On the other hand, Nkrumah’s policies failed to achieve the 
much touted goal of industrialization or economic transformation.  
As at 1966 when the CPP was overthrown, Ghana’s economy was still 
dependent on primary commodity export. According to Clark & Söderling, 
(2000, p.5) ‚Nkrumah left Ghana no better off than when he started‛. 
Indeed, much of the economic plans of the CPP could not materialize 
because of the collapse in cocoa prices in the mid-1960s resulting in 
dwindling foreign exchange earnings for the country. Between 1959 and 
1966, the value of Ghana’s export slugged around £110 million, due largely 
to the fall in the price of cocoa (Essek, 1975). With dwindling foreign 
exchange, the state-led big push import substitution policy of the 
government at the time was undermined and this adversely impacted on 
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the economic life of the average Ghanaian. Reduced foreign exchange 
earnings resulted in balance of payment problems and forced the 
government into excessive borrowing from abroad under supplier’s credit 
(Adom & Zogbator, 2015; Akornor, 2006). 
In line with the socialist ideology, the CPP refused to devalue the 
national currency and engaged in a policy of import control through 
import licensing. The results of these policies were shortage of essential 
goods, depletion of the country’s reserves and high national debt, amongst 
other (Berry, 1994; Clark & Söderling, 2000). In the midst of the economic 
hardship, Nkrumah’s attempt to solicit international financial assistance 
yielded very little as the government have exhausted concessionaries 
granted by eastern bloc countries and was unable to attract funds from the 
west due to ideological reasons.  The economic dissatisfaction or discontent 
partly resulted in the overthrow of the CPP in 1966 (Austin, 1966; Fuller, 
2014). 
The National Liberation Council (NLC), which overthrew the CPP 
shifted Ghana’s economic policy towards the neoliberal end of the 
ideological spectrum. The military junta made attempts to reverse 
Nkrumah’s socialist policies of import substitution. As an alternative, the 
government of the NLC turned to IMF and western donors and backed 
neoliberal economic policies in an attempt to revive the economy (Adom & 
Zogbator, 2015; Hutchful, 1987; Fosu & Aryeetey, 2008; Killick, 2010; 
Quartey, 2005). In line with neoliberal understanding, the state was seen as 
the main challenge to economic growth and neoliberal policies such as 
devaluation and privatization were pursued in an attempt to cut back the 
state. Some of the state-owned enterprises established by Nkrumah were 
privatized and the economy opened to international competition (Adom & 
Zogbator, 2015; Hutchful, 1987). 
Notwithstanding the initial successes of the NLC, its policies resulted in 
high levels of inflation, job losses in the formal sector, unemployment, high 
national debt and economic hardship for the generality of the people. By 
the time the NLC handed over to the government of Kofi A. Busia in 1969, 
Ghana’s national debt stood at some estimated US$580 million (equivalent 
to 25 % of GDP) (McLaughlin & Owusu-Ansah, 1994, p.3). 
The Progress Party (PP) continued with the neoliberal policies of the 
NLC. The lynchpin of the PP government’s economic policy was the 
private sector. Unlike the state led industrialization of the CPP, the PP 
emphasized a minimum role of the state and an aggressive emphasis on the 
private sector. Thus, neoliberal economic policies including devaluation of 
the national currency, relaxation of import and foreign exchange controls 
and others were pursued. Foreign investment was encourage in the 
industrial sector of the economy (McLaughlin & Owusu-Ansah, 1994). 
However, Busia maintained most of the state Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
inherited from Nkrumah regardless of their unprofitability largely due to 
political reasons. Indeed, these enterprises became the channel for 
distributing rents for political support (McLaughlin & Owusu-Ansah, 1994, 
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p.3). While the Busia government did not fully withdraw the state from the 
‘commanding heights’ of the economy, the general approach to economic 
policy was neoliberal and important neoliberal policies were pursued.    
Notwithstanding the change to a neoliberal economic agenda, the 
objectives of economic policy in Ghana remained the same. It was to propel 
economic growth and change the structure of Ghana’s economy from an 
agrarian economy to an industrial society. The only change was the 
theoretical framework of achieving the goal. The state led big push import 
substitution of Nkrumah (Scientific Socialism) was replaced by the market 
led neoliberal framework. 
Unfortunately, the tenure of the PP government was short-lived. It was 
overthrown in another military takeover in 1972, just two years into office. 
Economic grievances were adduced by the coup leaders as one of the major 
reasons for their intervention. The new administration was opposed to the 
neoliberal agenda of the PP. The leader of the National Redemption 
Council (NRC)/Supreme Military Council (SMC), I.K. Acheampong was 
unequivocal when he stated that:  
‚The political frame of reference which has guided your actions and 
your advice especially in the past two years, must be cast into the 
rubbish heap of history. This means a departure from the laissez-faire, 
so called free market economy and the institution of effective 
planning in the allocation and utilization of resources.‛3 
The SMC returned Ghana to a socialist oriented economic policy with 
the state as the main actor within the economic process.  As pointed out by 
Leith & Söderling (2000), among the first acts of the National Redemption 
Council was to decree ‚<a revaluation of the Cedi; a return of control prices 
to their pre-devaluation levels; a refusal to pay ‚unjust‛ foreign loans that 
had been taken out by previous civilian governments; and a fourfold 
increase in the minimum wage. The NRC also launched with great fanfare 
‚Operation Feed Yourself,‛ to achieve national food self-sufficiency‛ (Clark 
& Söderling, 2000). 
The NRC/SMC resuscitated most of the CPP era economic policies. The 
NRC’s commitment to dependency theory inspired policies was 
unquestionable. In line with the dependency orientation of the regime, in 
December 1972 the NRC through a decree acquired a 55% equity 
participation in foreign owned mining and timber companies operating in 
Ghana. The government went further to nationalize Ashanti Goldfields and 
the Volta Aluminium Company (Clark & Söderling, 2000). These policies 
however failed to propelled Ghana’s development and only reinforced the 
challenges of poverty and underdevelopment. Crucially, they left the 
country still dependent on the export of primary products, particularly 
cocoa. As Acheampong’s policies gradually brought the economy to a halt, 
he was forced out of office by General Akuffo, in what was termed the 
‘palace coup’ in 1978. Though Akuffo was more flexible in terms of 
 
3 Acheampong, (1973) Speeches and Interviews, Chairman of the National Redemption 
Council, p.31. 
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economic policies, state led development was still the hallmark of the 
regime (Aryeetey, Harrigan, & Nissanke, 2000). 
By 1979, Ghana’s economy was virtually bankrupt with shortage of 
essential commodities. Capitalizing on the popular discontent, the Armed 
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) overthrew the SMC II. The AFRC 
spent just three months in office and had no coherent economic programme 
to tackle the root of the economic challenges. In what was termed ‚a house 
cleaning exercise‛, the AFRC burn down the central Accra market in a 
populist move to tackle high prices of consumer goods. Three former heads 
of state including Afrifa, Acheampong and Akuffo were executed by firing 
squared for corruption (Adedeji, 2001; Arnold, 2005). The AFRC handed 
over power to civilian rule after three months in office.  
At the time, the Peoples National Party (PNP) and Dr. Hilla Limann 
took office in 1979, Ghana’s economic situation is daunting and needed 
major reforms. However, the PNP was unable to take major policy decision 
because of internal divisions among ideologues within the party. While 
socialist hawks insisted on a state-led development agenda, liberal 
elements within the government called for neoliberal reforms and a 
program with the World Bank and IMF. Largely, Limann’s government 
became a government of indecision and was overthrown in December, 1981 
by the Provisional National Defence Council led by J.J. Rawlings.  
Following a populist Libyan model of revolution, the new military junta 
sought to tackle the challenges of economic development, particularly the 
shortage of essential goods through confrontation with businessmen and 
women who were deemed corrupt. Price and exchange rate control and 
hostility towards foreign capital had not helped the economic situation to 
improve. Consequently the economy deterioration continued and was 
compounded by drought in 1982 and Nigeria’s expulsion of thousands of 
Ghanaians who were illegally residing in that country.  
To address the issues, the PNDC looked towards the Eastern bloc 
countries for economic assistance. Unfortunately, the government was 
unable to secure any meaningful economic help from it ideological allies. 
Consequently, in 1984, the PNDC made what is popularly called ‚U-turn‛ 
and adopted the World Bank/IMF sponsored Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAP). The SAP was Western donor driver and originates 
from the Bretton Woods institutions’ simplistic diagnosis of the African 
economic stagnation as a product of macroeconomic imbalance and market 
distortion that need to be corrected by disengaging or cutting back the state 
from the market (UNCTAD, 2002, pp.1-2). It took no account of the African 
complex socio-political and cultural environment.  The PNDC adhered 
strictly to the neoliberal tenets of the programme and was largely able to 
improve the macroeconomic situation. The political arrangement and 
policy position of the PNDC during this period can be likened to the 
Chinese political and economic system of today - an authoritarian (military) 
government pursuing neoliberal policies. However, unlike the Chinese, the 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 I.K. Hlovor, & Y. Shaibu. JEPE, 6(1), 2019, p.39-57. 
50 
50 
PNDC was not in absolute control of how the reforms unfolded, it was 
dictated from without with less attention to local conditions.   
The adoption and the implementation of the Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAP) or the Economic Recovery Programmes (ERP) as they 
were locally called in the mid-1980s by Ghana was taunted as an example 
of the ‚success story‛ of the neoliberal agenda within the West African sub-
region (Kraus, 1991; Jeong, 1995; Meng, 2004). In line with the market-led 
neoliberal paradigm, the PNDC embarked on economic restructuring by 
pursuing vigorously policies of devaluing the national currency, reduction 
of budget deficit, retrenchment of public labour, rehabilitation of 
infrastructure, privatization of state owned enterprises, exchange rate 
liberation and foreign direct investment promotion. These policies had seen 
significant improvement in Ghana’s macroeconomic performance. From a 
negative GDP growth prior to the adoption of the SAP in 1984, the country 
witnessed on the average, more than 5 percent annual GDP growth since 
1984.  
However, the SAP adversely affected the livelihood of the generality of 
the Ghanaian population, particularly the poor (Easterly, 2001). It came at 
great social, economic and environmental cost to the people. Cutbacks in 
education, health, welfare expenditure and retrenchment of public labour 
brought economic hardship to many. In addition, local businesses and 
industries were unable to compete favourably with foreign business due to 
the removal of protective measures which hitherto shielded them (Agyei-
Mensah & de-Graft Aikins, 2010; Adedeji, 2001). The PNDC was forced to 
address these challenges by implementing Programme of Action to 
Mitigate the Social Cost of Adjustment (PAMSCAD). PAMSCAD, however, 
had little effect in alleviating the plight of the people (Brydon & Legge, 
1996). 
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Western agenda had shifted from 
pure economic reforms to governance reform. The World Bank in its 1989 
report on Sub-Sahara Africa noted that the African crises is a ‚crises of 
governance‛ (World Bank, 1989). In other words, thenew Western 
diagnoses of the African development challenges was that ‘poor 
governance’ or lack of good governance and democracy were responsible 
for underdevelopment on the continent. Thus, neoliberal economic policies 
need to be underlined by western liberal democratic governance structures. 
Subsequently, democratic political reforms became part of the conditions 
for assessing western funding.In line with this development and domestic 
political pressure for democratization, Ghanareturned to constitutional 
democratic rule in 1993 (Oquaye, 2004; Gyimah-Boadi, 2004). The 
returnonly aligned the political system to the neoliberal economic policy 
agenda.  
The National Democratic Congress (NDC) which was essentially the 
PNDC in civilian regalia continued with the many liberal economic reforms 
initiated during the PNDC era. By 2000 when the NDC left office, the 
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failures of the liberalization programme were obvious. The situation in 
Ghana by 2000 was succinctly summarised by Meng (2004). 
In the past two decades of being the IMF and World Bank ‚success 
story‛, Ghana has simultaneously confronted the challenge of 
increasing dependence on foreign aid, an exponential external debt, 
high rates of unemployment and poverty, and deindustrialization 
resultant from the elimination of protective measures. 
This ultimate goal of industrialisation and development was not 
achieved by the neoliberal policies since 1984. On the contrary, the 
industrial base of Ghana has been eroded due to exposure of infant 
domestic companies international competition. The result of this 
deindustrialization of Ghana is what has been termed ‚Growth without 
development‛ (Ayelazuno, 2014). Periods of growth are normally driven 
by higher demands and prices of raw materials in the international market. 
The economy then begins to experience difficulties during periods of low 
demand for raw materials in the international market. 
A change of government brought thethe New Patriotic Party (NPP) to 
power in 2001. The overall policy direction of the NPPgovernment was to 
create an enabling environment for the private sector to thrive (Golden Age 
of Business), while reducing the role of the state to minimum regulation 
and provision of social service.  
The huge public debt, high inflation and falling national currency 
inherited by the Kuffour-led administration led the country to apply for the 
World Bank Highly Poor Indebted Countries Initiative. Access to funds 
under the HIPC initiative was dependent on implementation of structural 
adjustment reforms aimed at macroeconomic stabilization, reducing credit 
to government, inflation reduction, trade liberalization, and the preparation 
of Poverty Reduction Strategy. The Poverty Reduction Papers was then the 
new framework for World Bank and IMF activities in developing countries 
(ActionAid Ghana, 2010, p.15). The country had consequently prepared 
and implemented an interim GPRS (2001-2002), and GPRS I and II (2003-
2010) (Whitfield, 2005). 
In November 2006, the country successfully exited the IMF programme 
with the economy largely stabilised and the hope of a new beginning 
without neoliberal conditionalities. Unfortunately, this hope was short-
lived. In 2008,the economic situation began to deteriorate.The global 
financial crises, weak economic fundamentals (increasing inflation, budget 
deficit, cedi depreciation etc), and worsening credit rating, forced the 
incoming NDC (Mills-Mahama) administration to reengage the IMF for a 3 
years Extended Credit Facilities (ECF) with conditionalities (inflation 
reduction, cutting of public expenditure, reducing the budget deficit etc) 
between 2009 and 2011. The implementation of reforms again helped 
Ghana to stabilise the economic situation. However, this resulted in higher 
levels of unemployment (ActionAid Ghana, 2010). 
By 2010, the country had attained lower middle income economic status.  
Notwithstanding this, there are structural challenges to the economy. The 
economy is highly dependent on the export of primary commodities i.e. 
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gold, cocoa and lately petroleum. Industrial growth, particularly 
manufacturing remains very weak. This situation has made the country 
vulnerable to external shocks, particularly fluctuations in the price of its 
major export commodities. To correct this, the government launched the 
Ghana Shared Growth and Development Strategy. The lynchpin of the 
policy is to develop an export led economy with modernized agriculture 
linked with industry. In this regard, deliberate measures were put in place 
to encourage manufacturing and value addition to the country’s raw 
materials before export (National Development Planning Commission, 
2010). 
In 2014, the president presented an elaborate policy document entitled 
Agenda for Transformation, which aimed at accelerating the transformation 
of the country’s economy from an agrarian economy to light industry 
export led economy. The policy emphasized the need to provide support to 
prioritized companies to lead Ghana’s industrial transformation. In relation 
to this, cabinet approved for the establishment of an Export and Import 
Bank of Ghana.  
In 2015, the government entered into a credit facility with the IMF amid 
economic pressure arising from high inflation, a prolonged power crises, 
high budget deficit and dwindling revenue due to falling prices of major 
exports. The three year credit facility came with condition of freezing 
public sector employment, reducing the budget deficit and other austerity 
measures.The programme was subsequently extended by the NPP (Nana 
Addo led) administration to April 2019.  
 
4. Emerging development policy issues in Ghanasince 
2016 - One district one factory concept 
The return of the NPP to power with an overwhelming majority at the 
2016 polls was largely due to the many economic challenges confronting 
the country. A freeze on public sector employment for the greater part of 
the eight years NDC administration (2008-2016) has precipitated what for 
the lack of better words can be described as an ‘unemployment crises’, 
particularly among young graduates. The situation is compounded by a 
major power crises between 2012 and 2016, which contributed to an 
estimated average production loss of US $ 2.1 million per day (Kumi, 2017; 
ISSER, 2015). The power crises popularly termed ‚dumsor‛ adversely 
impacted on the ability of the private sector to expand and provide 
employment for young school leavers. 
In addition, the perennial challenges of depreciation of the national 
currency (cedi), rising inflation, trade deficit, and growing public debt 
confronted the new managers of the national economy. These challenges 
are partly the result of structure of the Ghanaian economy, which is 
dependent on raw material exportation with a weak manufacturing base. A 
compilation of the contributions of various sector to economic growth in 
Ghana by Alagidede, Baah-Boateng, & Nketiah-Amponsah (2013) between 
1984 and 2012 shows that industral growth in Ghana is mainly driven by 
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the mining and construction sector. The manufacturing base of the 
economy remains weak and its contribution to overall growth had been on 
the decline since 1993 (Alagidede, Baah-Boateng, & Nketiah-Amponsah, 
2013). They also pointed out that a shift from the dorminance of agriculture 
to the dorminance of the service sector is not evidence of the structural 
transformation of the economy. According to them,‚evidence available 
suggests that the dominance of informal activities in the services sector and 
the dwindling importance of manufacturing in economic arrangements 
make it difficult for this structural shift to be judged as structural 
transformation of the Ghanaian economy‛ (Alagidede, Baah-Boateng, & 
Nketiah-Amponsah, 2013, p.10). 
From 2007 to 2016, data from the Ghana Statistical Service reveals that 
the observations of Alagidede, Baah-Boateng, & Nketiah-Amponsah (2013) 
about the sectorial growth and contribution to GDP had not changed (see 
Table 2&3). In 2015 and 2016, the industrial sector grew at -0.3 and -0.5 
respectively. The sector remains weak and uncompetitive in the face of 
foreign competition from imported products. Osei-Assibey (2015) 
succinctly summarised the issue by stating that, ‚the country continues to 
export primary commodities such as unrefined minerals, raw agricultural 
products, and crude oil, together contributing about 86 percent of the 
country’s total exports‛ (Osei-Assibey, n.d.). 
 
Table 1. Growth Rates of Gross Domestic Product at Constant 2006 Prices (percent) 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Agriculture -1.7  7.4  7.2  5.3  0.8  2.3  5.7  4.6  2.8  3.0  
Industry 6.1  15.1  4.5  6.9  41.6  11.0  6.6  0.8  -0.3  -0.5  
Manufacturing -1.2  3.7  -1.3  7.6  17.0  2.0  -0.5  -0.8  2.2  2.7  
Services 7.7  8.0  5.6  9.8  9.4  12.1  10.0  5.6  6.3  5.7  
Source: Ghana Statistical Service 
 
Table 2. Distribution of Gross Domestic Product (at Basic Prices) by Economic Activity 
(percent) 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Agriculture 30.4 29.1 31.0 31.8 29.8 25.3 22.9 22.4 21.5 20.3 
Industry 20.8 20.7 20.4 19.0 19.1 25.6 28.0 27.8 26.6 25.1 
Manufacturing 10.2 9.1 7.9 6.9 6.8 6.9 5.8 5.3 4.9 4.8 
Services 48.8 50.2 48.6 49.2 51.1 49.1 49.1 49.8 51.9 54.6 
Source: Ghana Statistical Service 
 
The new NPP administration like previous governments in Ghanaian 
history was confronted with the challenge of transforming the economy by 
ensuring value addition to raw materials through manufacturing. A key 
strategy in transforming Ghana to an industrial powerhouse within the 
West African Sub-region is the implementation of the ‘ONE DISTRICT 
ONE FACTORY’ (ODOF) imitative. The initiative was a campaign promise 
of the then opposition NPP. Being a campaign promise, it is mainly a 
Ghanaian home grown idea without foreign input. It aims to ensure even 
distribution of industries across the country and providing a path to the 
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industrial development of Ghana.According to the ODOF secretariat, the 
aim of the government is to ‚address the problem by undertaking a 
massive industrialisation campaign across the country, which will equip 
and empower communities to utilise their local resources in manufacturing 
products that are in high demand both locally and internationally. This will 
allow the country to reap the well known rewards of industrialisation, such 
as gains in efficiency in every facet of life in our society, increase in 
agricultural and manufacturing output, a reduction in the reliance on 
imports and increase in the production of consumer goods and food 
availability‛ (One District One Factory Secretariat, 2018). The minimum 
numerical target is to have a factory in each of the 254 districts in Ghana by 
2020. The new government, therefore, embark on many foreign trips to sell 
the idea to foreign investors. The government equally encouraged local 
businessmen to take advantage of the initiative by partnering foreign 
investors or having their investments registered under the programme. 
The policy is ambitious in scope and ‚since Kwame Nkrumah’s regime 
in the early 1960s, no government has demonstrated such a level of 
commitment to the economic transformation of districts in Ghana‛ 
(Haruna, 2017, p.4). However, unlike the state owned enterprises 
(Socialism) of Nkrumah, the current policy is best described as ‘public or 
state initiated and private sector driven industrialization strategy’. The 
strategy is defined by the active role of the state in assisting private 
investors to explore and invest in areas considered by the government as 
having the potential to provide employment and add value to the country’s 
exports. In this regard, the ODOF secretariat has identifiedeight (8) main 
priority areas under the initiative. These are input/raw material producer 
groups, Agro processing and business, Textiles and Clothing, ICT, 
Pharmaceutical and cosmetics, Waste management, Distribution and 
trading, and Tourism, Arts and Crafts (One District One Factory 
Secretariat, 2018). The strategic areas shows that far from being motivated 
by mere desire to diversify exports and the economy, the policy aims also 
to improve all sectors of the Ghanaian economy.  
The government in partnership with some financial institutions (Ghana 
Exim Bank, GCB Bank, CNBM, UMB and Access Bank) is also facilitating 
access to credit for the projects registered under the initiative, although, it is 
the investors who are responsible for the  credit facilities and any related 
liability. To support the programme, the government has acquired US $ 2 
billion loan facility from the government of the People’s Republic of China 
(Haruna, 2017). That this loan was given at a period that Ghana was under 
IMF bailout programme shows Beijing willingness to support countries 
without the conditionalities of western donors. The disbursement is 
however done through the partner financial institutions (Ghana Exim Bank, 
GCB Bank, CNBM, UMB and Access Bank).  
By this strategy, the government is able to achieve a dynamic balance 
between active state involvement and private sector led industrialization. 
However, there are many issues that need to be addressed to ensure its 
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sustainability in the long term. Among these issues are ensuring reliable 
power supply, improving infrastructure facilities, (particularly roads and 
railways to link the industries to commercial centres), ensuring regular 
supply of raw materials, maintaining macroeconomic stability, and 
avoiding political patronage in selecting investors. Again, political 
commitment not only from the NPP but also the opposition NDC is needed 
for the long term success of the new approach. Oppositional politics, which 
manifest in excessive criticism of government policies and efforts to 
undermine policies regardless of the benefit to society of the policies must 
give way to national consensus on this important policy.     
 
5. Conclusion 
The potential of this innovative policy to transform Ghana’s economy 
cannot be overstated. It is an important innovation in the quest to 
industrialised Ghana. With other important policy inventions such as the 
Planting for Food and Jobs, and One village One dam initiatives, the 
government of Ghana is experimenting new innovative ways of addressing 
the challenges of poverty and underdevelopment. As the country prepares 
to exit the latest IMF supported adjustment programme, it is incumbent on 
the government or any successor to continue on the path of innovation and 
experimentation. Development options are not cast in stone and there is no 
universal path to industrialisation and development. Perhaps, the 
Ghanaian leadership, after years of attempting without success is 
beginning to read the ‘Chinese story’ in terms of being innovative and 
tailoring policies to domestic circumstances.  
The new industrialisation policy aligned favourably with the three 
tenets of the Beijing consensus identified by Ramón (2004). It is innovative, 
self-determined, and aimed at poverty reduction and improving the 
standard of living of Ghanaians. Ghana has taken an important first step in 
experimenting a new form of home-grown industrialisation policy.Perhaps, 
this time, the anchor will hold on ideas cooked and mastered in Beijing and 
not Washington. 
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